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Comment
Judicial Enforcement of Moral Imperatives:
Is the Best Interest of the Child Being
Sacrificed to Maintain Societal
Homogeneity?*
I. INTRODUCTION
When parents divorce, courts are forced to deternine which parent should
obtain custody of the children. The applicable standard in all states for
deciding who should receive custody is the "best interest of the child."' The
"best interest of the child" is a broad standard which of necessity takes into
account many varying characteristics of those vying for custody. The child's
best interest is served by balancing the positive and negative characteristics of
one party against those of all opposing parties and placing the child with the
party best able to serve the child's needs.
One factor courts balance in making this determination is the morality of
the parent, often judged by reference to behaviors deemed to implicate
morality. The concept of morality itself, although rather nebulous, implicates
a wide range of behaviors and characteristics. In judging morality, courts
sometimes target specific behaviors or characteristics to indicate pervasive
immorality in a parent. Courts which engage in such simplistic judgments
often give disproportionate weight to these characteristics in balancing the best
interest of the child. Without considering the competing "moral infirmities"
of opposing parties, some courts go so far as to conclusively establish that
parents possessing any such targeted behaviors or characteristics are per se
unfit to obtain custody of their children.
To the extent a parent's views or behaviors can be shown to negatively
impact a child, they are a proper factor to be weighed in balancing the best
interest of the child. However, when a court attaches harm to a behavior or
characteristic based merely on a stereotype, the best interest of the child is
often sacrificed in favor of enforcing a moral imperative.
It is commonly recognized that "courtrooms should be safe havens from
the glut of prejudice that festers in the outside world."2 However, throughout
history the courts have sanctioned private prejudice in child custody cases by
* Recipient of the 1994 Laura Elizabeth Skaer Writing Prize.
1. HOMER J. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UN=TED
STATES § 19.4 (1988).
2. Johnson v. Sohlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 838 (N.D. 1993) (Levine, J.,
concurring).
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denying parents the right to raise their children in accordance with their own
moral standards if those standards clash with the views enforced by the
court? The ones who suffer from this courtroom battle to define morality are
the children who are denied a relationship with their parents.
Society generally accepts the court's judgment of right and wrong when
that judgment corresponds to prevailing moral standards. However, as the
prevailing view of society changes, the court's view of morality is often
scrutinized and criticized and ultimately changes as societal pressure to do so
increases.4 This Comment will analyze the historical shift in moral judgment
of interracial relationships, the judicial response to the changing public view
and the effect of the changing public view on child custody decisions. It will
then juxtapose that history with the current change in societal judgment of gay
and lesbian relationships and the corresponding judicial response with respect
to custody disputes.
II. JUDIcIAL RESPONSE TO INTERRACIAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Anti-Miscegenation Laws' Reflected Popular Moral Beliefs
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court recognized that laws are
largely based on prevailing morality and ultimately change when society's
morals change.6 The Court stated, "We set up government by consent of the
governed.... Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public
opinion by authority."1 The law represents the boundaries of majoritarian
social acceptance, defining permissible actions and reflecting what society
deems permissible attitudes. The boundaries are formed by every statute,
court decision, and action of authority, and are constantly shifting as the tides
of change sweep across America. When the moral attitudes of society begin
3. See, e.g., infra part II.C.
4. This is evidenced by the changing rules governing custody awards to parents
engaged ininterracial relationships (See infrapart 11.0.), fathers of infant children (See
24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 785 (1966)); Thomas R. Trenkner,
Annotation, Modern Status of Maternal Preference Rule or Presumption in Child
Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R.3D 262 (1976)), and parents accused of spousal abuse. At
the forefront of the moral debate in child custody determinations today is whether
homosexual parents are morally fit to be awarded custody of their children.
5. Anti-miscegenation laws are laws enacted to prohibit racial mixing, usually by
outlawing interracial marriage.
6. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)
(affrming holding which enjoined enforcement of a West Virginia regulation
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to clash with the boundaries that define permissible perspectives, change is
imminent. The battle to define these boundaries should not be one simply of
might, but one where the scales of justice respond sensitively to the plea of
the oppressed. In order to maintain freedom, American jurisprudence must
remember history by reflecting on how the boundaries have changed, not by
examining the specifics of where they once stood.
The historical battle over judicial acceptance of interracial sexual
relationships illustrates the proposition that laws reflectprevailing morality and
change when society's concept of morality changes. With the abolition of
slavery came an influx of a new breed of free Americans-AmericanNegroes.
Because Blacks had no legal rights, society and its boundaries were defined
by the white majority. A "natural order" of white superiority was morally
espoused and legally enforced. However, "human sexual behavior did not
respect the 'natural order' and mixed race children invariably sprang up
wherever the races had contact."' Anti-miscegenation laws quickly followed
in an attempt to legally enforce the prevailing moral standard which natural
relations between humans "did not respect."9 Such laws were introduced "to
prevent what [white legislators] saw as the 'abominable mixture and spurious
issue' by penalizing whites who engaged in interracial sex."10
The state of Virginia has been called "the 'mother' of American slavery
and a leader in the gradual debasement of blacks.""1 When slavery was
abolished, Virginia was among the first to find alternate legal methods to
perpetuate its exaltation of Whites and degradation of Blacks by instituting
anti-miscegenation laws to preserve the purity of the white race.12 A total
of thirty-eight states adopted legislation at one time or another outlawing
interracial marriage. 3 Those who defended these laws did so by relying on
moral imperatives. In upholding the Virginia law banning interracial
marriages, the Court in Loving v. Virginia4 stated, "Almighty God created
the races [different colors] and placed them on [different] continents. And but
for the interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that God separated the races shows that he did not intend
8. Barbara K. Kopytoff and A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Purity and




11. Id. at 1967.
12. Id.
13. James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 97 (1993).
14. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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for the races to mix."15 The "moral" foundation on which laws governing
intermingling of the races were built has since been exposed to be one of fear
and ignorance.16
An 1878 Virginia Supreme Court opinion articulated the moral
justifications to which many adhered in support of anti-miscegenation statutes:
The purity of public morals, [and] the moral and physical development of
both races... require that [the races] should be kept distinct and separate,
and that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem
to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law and be subject to no
evasion.
17
Laws banning interracial sexual relationships were actively enforced to
regulate behavior. In 1630, a white Virginian was ordered "to be soundly
whipt before an assembly of negroes and others for abusing himself to the
dishonor of God and shame of Christianity by defiling his body in lying with
a negro. 11'
The fear of a social uprising fueled the passion with which many fought
to legally subdue Blacks and to keep the ghost of social change from haunting
American neighborhoods. In a debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a
member of the House of Representatives argued:
Now, what does all this mean but mixed schools and perfect social
equality? It is nothing more or less; and the next step will be that [Blacks]
will demand a law allowing them, without restraint, to visit the parlors and
drawing-rooms of the whites, and have free and unrestrained social
15. Id. at 3 (citing trial court).
16. The very word "miscegenation" is an Americanism referring to interracial
sexual relations and literally means "the mixing of different species." Victoria
Neufeldt & David B. Guralnik, Eds., WMSTi's NEV WoRLD DICTIONARY 866 (3d
College ed. 1988); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy
Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 159 (1988).
17. Kinneyv. Virginia, 30 Graft. 858, 869 (Va. 1878) (holding that an interracial
couple married outside the state violated Virginia's anti-miscegenation law when they
entered Virginia).
18. Kopytoff, supra note 8, at 1989 (quoting Minutes of the CoUNCIL AND
GENERAL COURT OF CoLoNLL ViRGInIA 479 (H.R. MdIlwaine 1st ed. 1924)). In a
1772 lawsuit concerning unjust enslavement, the slave owner's lawyer appealed to the
moral standard of the court when he argued:
[S]ocieties of men could not subsist unless there were a subordination of
one to another, and that from the highest to the lowest degree.... [T]his
was conformable with the general scheme of the Creator, observable in
other parts of his great work.
[Vol. 59
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intercourse with your unmarried sons and daughters. It is bound to come
to that-there is no disguising the fact; and the sooner the alarm is given
and our people take heed the better it will be for our civilization.'9
Judicial acceptance of the moral philosophy that Blacks and Whites should not
mix was a direct result of the philosophical beliefs of those propelled into
powerful, influentialpositions. In the struggle to legally define the boundaries
of social acceptance, those who capture authority have an inherent advantage
over those not in power. Those wishing to maintain a certain boundary
invoke their concept of morality "to define 'deviance' in ways that produce
stigma, excluding people from respectable membership in the community....
This exclusionary function of law is understood not only by those who are
stigmatized but also by those who are using the law to draw the community's
boundaries."20
The next set of laws that emerged to deal with the changing face of
American society dealt with the offspring of mixed race couples. Legal
definitions of race were adopted to categorize children with multi-colored
ancestry.2 Such laws not only defined the labels these children wore, but
defined their legal status as well. Commentators have suggested that such
legislation was "an effort to bring the law into line with social practice."' 2
Anti-miscegenation laws and laws defining race did not arise until they were
necessary for whites to maintain control.' As society changed with the
influx of interracial couples and mulatto offspring, those wishing to maintain
disintegrating social stigmas used their politicalpower to impose legal stigmas.
Historically, such legal stigmas have stood only to fall in the same way they
were built-by a society choosing to define its boundaries of moral acceptance
consistent with its experience.
B. Anti-Miscegenation Laws Were Banned Following a
Change in Moral Climate
Laws outlawing interracial marriage were challenged on constitutional-
grounds and were repeatedly upheld for over one hundred years before their
19. Trosino, supra note 13, at 101.
20. Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in
Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 677, 690 (1991).
21. Kopytoff, supra note 8, at 1967 n.4, 1976.
22. Kopytoff, supra note 8, at 1978; See also JAMES HUGO JOHNSTON, RACE
RELATIONS IN VRGn A AND MISCEGENATION IN THE SOUTH, 1776-1860, at 209-14
(1970).
23. Kopytoff, supra note 8, at 1989.
1994]
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eventual downfall.24 In 1882, the United States Supreme Court first
addressed the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws in Pace v.
Alabama.' The Pace Court found that such laws did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment." It was not until eighty-five years later, when the
Supreme Court revisited the issue in Loving v. Virginia" that laws outlawing
interracial marriage were found to violate the Constitution." This varied
result from applying the same constitutional standards to the same law is
largely explainable by the change in moral climate between 1882 and 1967.
"As social conditions changed and legal barriers to segregation fell in the
1960s,"2 9 the legal response to personal relationships between Blacks and
Whites changed.
In 1967, when the United States Supreme Court declared anti-
miscegenation laws unconstitutional, fourteen states had recently repealed laws
outlawing interracial marriages, and sixteen states, including Missouri,
maintained such laws." Clearly, the political climate with respect to
relations between Blacks and Whites was in flux. "A political issue comes
into being-a situation becomes a 'problem,' in the political sense-when
different groups define events and behavior differently, giving them rival
meanings."'31 Laws surrounding interracial relationships became a "political
problem" in the sixties when groups rose up challenging the separation of
races as a moral standard. Highly publicized protests to traditional standards,
such as student sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, and the Montgomery Bus Strikes,
were instrumental in awakening the conscience of society and influencing
court decisions. 2 Prior to the Loving decision, interracial marriages were
punished by imprisonment in many states.33  Tearing down anti-
miscegenation laws allowed natural relations to proceed without legal
impediment when consistent with an individual's moral constructs.34
Few legal scholars today would disagree that laws banning interracial
marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet such laws were consistently
24. Trosino, supra note 13, at 18.
25. 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
26. Id. at 585.
27. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Id. at 12.
29. Jo Beth Eubanks, Comment, TransracialAdoption in Texas: Should the Best
Interest Standard be Color-Blind?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1225, 1254 (1993).
30. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, n.5.
31. Karst, supra note 20, at 687.
32. HOWvELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED (Penguin Books 1977).
33. Trosino, supranote 13, at 18.
34. Id. at 93 .("[B]y 1992 more than a thousand interracial marriages [were]
performed annually in a new and more tolerant Virginia.").
[Vol. 59
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upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment for over one hundred years prior to
Loving. One commentator stated that:
[o]n a symbolic level, any resort to a race-matching policy means that the
state and social agencies assume the responsibility of deciding what 'the
appropriate racial composition of families' is, rather than the families
themselves. The state should not actively discourage the creation of
interracial families, because such units may reinforce a 'positive good' of
racial and cultural understanding.35
When does an issue become a sufficiently significant "political problem"
that the judicial response is to allow individual choice rather than impose
societal uniformity? It was not the government's role to design families in
1967, nor was it their role in 1882. However, it took a change in the moral
standards of a portion of society to realize that government was designing
families through anti-miscegenationlaws by denying individuals legal freedom
to pursue chosen relations. Legal mandates of acceptable family composition
are still not purged from the law, nor is it likely they ever will be.36
However, it is the legal duty and challenge of the court to draw boundaries
within the sanctity of the family only where necessary for the protection of
society and its children, and not as a means of arbitrary enforcement of a
hypothetical norm.
C. Moral Judgment of Interracial Relationships Stigmatizes
Parents in Custody Disputes
As a direct consequence of interracial sexual relationships came the next
tide of moral contention through which individuals attempted to advance their
moral agenda through judicial sanction. Many courts used society's lingering
antipathy toward interracial couples to justify denying custody to parents
involved in these relations. Because the "best interest of the child" is the
standard used in child custody determinations, defining interracial sexual
relationships as immoral provided a reason to deny custody to parents engaged
in such relationships. Living with a parent whose actions are labeled immoral
is rarely held to be in the best interest of a child. Unfortunately, many moral
imperatives incorporated into the legal structure have proven to be nothing
more than fear of change disguised as a menacing monster of moral infirmity
threatening to destroy the purity and integrity of children exposed to parents
35. Eubanks, supra note 29, at 1255.
36. In order to regulate disputes arising out of family relationships, it is necessary
to legally define what constitutes a family. Therefore, the law will always define the
boundaries of acceptable family composition.
1994]
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with such interests. When courts sanction diversity by relying on moral
imperatives to deny custody to a parent, courts not only enforce stereotypes,
but they risk abandoning their duty to provide for the best interest of the
child.
Morality implies a sense of knowing right and wrong. 7 Yet there is
often a blurred distinction between right and wrong which for years has drawn
philosophers and theologians to test their premises by measuring them against
some indicia of goodness. For example, the familiar maxim, "Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you,"38 is one such indicator of "moral"
action to which behavior may be juxtaposed. Clearly, determining right from
wrong is not an easy task. Right and wrong behavior, and thus moral
behavior, exists on a continuum. There is a range of behavior for which no
clear societal consensus distinguishing right from wrong exists. 9  As
members of society battle over the definition of right and wrong, the legal
response should be one of caution to uphold justice,40 while holding at
abeyance personal opinions in the ongoing debate over moral implications of
personal choice.
A central concern of child custody determinations is avoiding harm to the
child.41 Therefore, the court must balance the possible harm to a child from
37. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 16 at 882.
38. Matthew 7:12 (King James).
39. For example, passionate debates occur daily over the moral appropriateness
of behaviors such as abortion, premarital sex, use of alcohol and other drugs,
interracial relationships, possession of guns, distribution of condoms to teenagers,
corporal punishment, and homosexuality. Although legal constraints are placed on the
unbridled commission of all of these behaviors, engaging in them is, for the most part,
left up to the discretion of adults.
40. To uphold justice in the context of legal sanctions on behavior, courts must
balance the discemable harm which would result from allowing a behavior with the
discernable harm which would result from prohibiting it, taking into consideration all
those affected by the behavior. For a prospective harm to be considered, it should be
more probable than not that it will manifest itself. The weight given to a prospective
harm should be proportional to its probability of occurrence, adjusted by the gravity
of the harm as assessedby a consensus of experts in the area in which the harm might
occur. For example, if corporal punishment is allowed in public schools, some
children may be physically abused by school officials. Additionally, children who are
physically abused at home may associate corporal punishment with abuse and fear
adults from whom they might otherwise seek help. On the other hand, if corporal
punishment is not allowed, school authorities may be unable to effectively discipline
some children with behavior problems. These considerations must be balanced to
determine whether the goal of effective education is better served by allowing corporal
punishment in public schools.
41. Clark, supra note 1, § 19.4.
[Vol. 59
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exposure to a parent engaged in a gray area of moral behavior" against the
harm of judicial extinguishment of intimate parental bonds. By using moral
justification to stigmatize and punish parents for their nontraditional choices,
it is the children who ultimately suffer when relationships are severed.
Courts approaching custody issues where a child's parent has remarried
or become intimately involved with a member of another race have utilized
three options: (1) a presumption favoring placement of the child with members
of the same race only; (2) a preference for placing the child with members of
the same race if all other factors are equal; and (3) no racial preference.43
The problem implicated by giving effect to either the first or second judicial
response is that it replaces consideration of the best interest of an individual
child with a desire to enforce societal homogeneity. A presumption that living
in a racially diverse family is not in the best interest of a child "presents the
danger of perpetuating historical prejudices against interracial families and
reduces the question of the significance of race to a matter of mere personal
intuition.
44
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court addressed the propriety of
racial considerations in child custody determinations in Palmore v. Sidoti.45
The Palmore Court reviewed a Florida decision which transferred custody
from the natural mother to the father 6 based on the changed circumstance
that the mother, a white woman, was living with a black man. The Florida
court emphasized that the mother appeared to place her needs in front of the
child's, as evidenced by the fact that she lived with the man before marrying
him.4 ' However, the Florida court hinted at a deeper consideration when it
stated:
[Tihis Court feels that despite the strides that have been made in bettering
relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that [the child]
will, if allowed to remain [living with her white mother and black
stepfather] ... suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come. 9
The United States Supreme Court determined that the racial issue was
central to the decision to change custody and therefore overruled the Florida
42. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
43. Eubanks, supra note 29, at 1252-53.
44. Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the
Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 64 (1990/1991).
45. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
46. Id. at 434.
47. Id. at 430.
48. Id. at 431.
49. Id. at 431 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 26-27).
1994]
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decision.5" Despite the possibility that the child might suffer social pressure
due to her mother's interracial marriage, the Supreme Court stated, "The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect."51
Undeniably, certain children are more sensitive than others to the social
stigmatization attached to interracial relationships. In order to properly focus
on the needs of the child, such sensitivity should not be overlooked if it
manifests itself in a manner harmful to the child. Nor, however, should such
sensitivity be presumed before any sign of it arises when that presumption will
force a parent and a child to be physically separated.
The mere fact that some characteristic of the parent may expose the child
to the tauntings of other children should never be the driving force behind a
custody determination. Such a consideration would favor a wealthy parent
who is able to materially provide for the child over a poor parent who may
struggle to support the child's basic needs, and a physically able parent over
a disabled parent. Presuming that living in an interracial household will bring
more harm to a child than the benefit that could be derived from that home
and, conversely, that it will be more harmful than living in any other home in
which the child might be placed merely reinforces the stereotype that those
involved in interracial relationships are morally corrupt and socially inept.
The practical effect of the Palmore holding on racial issues in custody
determinations is unclear.52 While it is clear that the Court precluded a
presumption of harm attaching to racial considerations, "[i]t remains unclear
whether the Court intended that a showing of actual injury to a child would
permit race to be a controlling consideration in a custody dispute."" After
considering the holding in Palmore, the Kentucky Supreme Court allowed
consideration of the actual impact of a custodial parent's interracial marriage
on a child in a custody modification hearing.54 The court explained that a
"child's emotional reaction to her [parent's] marital circumstances may enter
into deciding what is in the best interest of the child if it is significant and
severe, and, if it does, this is a consideration whatever the cause."" While
issues relating to a parent's interracial relationship may enter a custody dispute
to the extent they are shown to cause harm to a child, Palmore precludes the
presumption of harm as a determining factor.56 The elimination of race from
50. Id. at 433.
51. Id. at 432.
52. Perry, supra note 44, at 56.
53. Eubanks, supra note 29, at 1246.
54. Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Ky. 1987).
55. Id.
56. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434.
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the forefront of custody disputes "protects the child from the damaging impact
of litigation of an issue about which there is limited empirical knowledge, but
which may be approached with unwarranted assumptions, racial prejudice, and
troubling value judgments." 7
D. Social Stigmas Outlive Legal Change
The "perceived natural order" of society, which in part accounted for
legal sanction of interracial relations, is still a reality in the minds of many
Americans." The legal reaction to increased tolerance of interracial sexual
relations has yet to uproot many deeply held beliefs that such relations are
immoral and not intended by God. 9 Forty-five percent of white Americans
responding to a 1991 Gallup poll disapproved of interracial marriages and
twenty percent believed such marriages should be illegal.6" While this is a
decrease from the 1972 statistic reporting that forty percent of white
Americans believed interracial marriages should be illegal,6 it illustrates the
fact that societal change is a slow moving process. To preserve freedom,
however, the judiciary must be at the forefront of recognizing individual
rights, not at the tail. Individual prejudice may be a reality, "but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give [private prejudice] effect."'62
III. JUDIcIAL RESPONSE TO HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS
A. Homosexual Parents Face Legal Battles Analogous to Those
Endured By Interracial Couples
Gay men and lesbians are not afforded the right to marry their partners
in any state." In several states, homosexual sodomy is still criminalized."
Despite the lack of legal recognition of same sex commitments, courts have
been forced to acknowledge that such relationships do exist when dealing with
child custody issues. Unlike race, the public debate over whether homosexual
57. Perry, supra note 44, at 127.
58. Trosino, supra note 13, at 93 n.2.
59. Id. at 114.
60. Trosino, supra note 13, at 120 nn.2-3.
61. Id. at 120 n.3.
62. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
63. Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,56 (Haw. 1993) (holding that restricting marital
partnerships to relations between males and females establishes a sex-based
classification subject to strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge and remanding
the case to determine if the state has a compelling reason for this classification.).
64. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
1994]
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behavior is the result of an unchangeable genetic characteristic or a moral
defect has not been conclusively decided. However, an increasing portion of
society is viewing homosexual acts as morally neutral behavior. 5 In the
United States, there are currently an estimated three million homosexual
parents who are the primary caretakers of between eight and ten million
children.66 As courts continue to grapple with the moral significance of
homosexuality, the issue arises, as it did in 1984 with parents of different
races, whether courts should deny custody to homosexual parents. Once
again, society and the judiciary have come to a crossroads, facing the choice
to accept individual differences or to force conformity among primary
caretakers by banning homosexual parents from raising their natural children
on the basis that lesbians and gay men are morally unfit to raise their natural
children. The court must determine whether allowing a child to be raised by
a gay or lesbian parent is more harmful than severing the child's relationship
with that parent by giving custody to a parent who may possess characteristics
harmful to the child while at the same time severely restricting the time, place,
and manner of visitation available to the lesbian or gay parent. In deciding
whether a lesbian could adopt her partner's natural child,67 a New Jersey
Superior Court opined that American society is currently
at a time of great change and a time of recognition that, while the families
of the past may have seemed simple formations repeated with uniformity
(the so called "traditional family") families have always been complex,
multifaceted, and often idealized.... [Flamilies differ in both size and
shape within and among the many cultural and socio-economic layers that
make up this society. We cannot continue to pretend that there is one
formula, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to
achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe children should
inhabit.
68
While racial differences are readily apparent, sexual orientation is not
physically discernable. No external standard of social stratification applies to
65. See, e.g., William A. Henry III, Pride and Prejudice, TIME, June 27, 1994,
at 54-59. "The rapid pace of change for gays owes much to the trails blazed by blacks
and women, and the success of those groups gives gays hope that in a generation or
so they will have attained full acceptance as just another piece fitting into the mosaic
of national life." Id. at 55.
66. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1508, 1629 (1989).
67. The child was conceived through artificial insemination. In re Adoption of
a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
68. Id. at 554-55.
[Vol. 59
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homosexuals as a group.69 Therefore, those desiring to keep gay men and
lesbians in a subordinated status rely on artificial constructs of morality to
stratify and debase gays and lesbians because of their sexual relationships
without inquiry into the basis of their behavior. By legally enforcing this
moral stratification, the court system has "rel[ied] on a social group's
subordinated status as a justification for further governmental action that
intensifies the subordination."7 Reliance on a group's socially inferior status
to create and enforce laws which further debase that group is "constitutionally
impermissible."'" Stated another way, it defies logic, freedom and notions
of equality to deny natural parents custody of their children because of the
court's desire to "require [the children] to be inculcated in society's antipathy
toward gay people." 2
Just as when the caste hierarchy morality of the slave era was waning,
many people today believe that "what was once a 'natural' and 'self-evident'
ordering [is] an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and
freedom."'73 Similar to miscegenation statutes, the purpose of laws based on
abstract morality which restrain individuals' rights to raise their children "is
to support a regime of caste that locks some people into inferior social
positions at birth." 4 By creating a moral hierarchy to induce stratification
between "traditional" and "non-traditional" families, society, lead mainly by
the ideals of the once powerful voice of mainstream religion,75 has forced a
segment of itself to cower under the scrutinizing eye of the politically
powerful. Legal sanctions have served to legitimize this artificially induced
69. This is in sharp contrast to other groups which have traditionally been
subjected to political debasement such as Blacks,women, and many citizens of foreign
descent. While stereotypical modes of dress, hairstyles and gender oriented behaviors
are often associated with sexual orientation, such characteristics are often found in
heterosexuals and often absent in homosexuals.
70. Karst, supra note 20, at 729. For example, homosexuals have been labelled
as immoral by many, placing them on a level of low esteem. Many courts have
justified denying lesbian and gay parents custody of their children by pointing to the
level of low esteem on which homosexuals have been placed, further isolating them
from mainstream society.
71. Id.
72. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal
Protection Analysis, 102 HARv. L. REv. 617, 632 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Custody
Denials].
73. Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 164 (1988) (quoting City of Clebume v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)).
74. Id. at 147.
75. Heather Rhoads, Cruel Crusade; The Holy War Against Lesbians and Gays,
TIE PRoGREssIVE, Mar. 1993, at 18.
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stratification. But as society recognizes this inequity, the illegitimacy of this
blind prejudice will be exposed.
Although sexual orientation, unlike race, is a trait which presumably can
be disguised or denied, homosexuals have traditionally been debased in
American society in ways similar to Blacks. Because there is currently no
scientific method to differentiate between homosexuals and heterosexuals, the
argument that homosexuality evidences moral degeneracy can be rebutted only
on philosophical grounds. In Bowers v. Hardwick,6 the Supreme Court, in
a five to four decision, declared that statutes outlawing sodomy were
constitutionally permissible. 7 Still, some members of the Supreme Court
have advanced the idea that homosexuality is a trait which, like race, should
receive a suspect classification. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun
analogized sodomy statutes, which disproportionately affect the sexual
behavior of gay men, to the anti-miscegenation laws outlined in Loving v.
Virginia. Blackmun stated that the similarities between sodomy laws and anti-
miscegenation laws were "almost uncanny."'" In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens made the same connection when he commented,
"Interestingly, miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to
sodomy.""° It took eighty-five years from the time the Supreme Court first
analyzed the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes until its decision in
Loving.81 Only eight years have passed since the Bowers decision. Perhaps
another eighty-five year gap will not be required to pass before the judicial
system releases its arbitrary enforcement of institutionalized morality and its
concomitant effect of institutionalized discrimination.
B. Society's View of Homosexuality is in a State of Flux
Notions of morality are nothing more than concepts of right and
wrong.' In a democratic society, the courts charged with enforcing right
and wrong theoretically do so by reference to an objective standard to
determine what behavior should be regulated. To the extent behavior can be
shown to harm members of society, society has an interest in seeing that it is
regulated. To the extent that behavior can be shown only to offend certain
individuals' concepts of right and wrong, society has an interest in allowing
differences of opinion to exist and in providing mutual legal respect for these
76. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
77. Id. at 192.
78. Koppelman, supra note 73, at 146.
79. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 n.5. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 n.9. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
82. WEBSTER'S NEW WoRLD DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 882.
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differences. There are a myriad of behaviors which give rise to hotly
contested "moral" issues among many sects of society which are not proper
for legal sanction because there is no basis, apart from an abstract belief, on
which to make a legal determination of right and wrong.' In such
situations, the law usually defers to the moral judgment of individuals to
determine and regulate their own behavior. As society changes, shifts in
moral judgments also occur. Just as interracial relationships fell into the
chasm of uncertain moral distinction in the 1960s, homosexual behavior is
currently descending the societal rungs from sexual deviance to permissible
behavior. As one court aptly stated:
Many people erroneously believe thatthe sexual experience of lesbians and
gay men represents the gratification of purely prurient interests, not the
expression of mutual affection and love. They fail to recognize that gay
people seek and engage in stable, monogamous relationships. Instead, to
many, the very existence of lesbians and gay men is inimical to the family.
For years, many people have branded gay people as abominations to nature
and considered lesbians and gay men mentally ill and psychologically
unstable. The stereotypes have no basis in reality and represent outmoded
notions about homosexuality, analogous to the 'outmoded notions' of the
relative capabilities of the sexes.
s4
While a growing portion of society refuses to morally stigmatize
homosexual behavior, many hold steadfastly to a belief that it is wrong.
There are currently twenty-five states which statutorily prohibit consensual
sodomy."5 Seven of these statutes apply only to homosexual sodomy. 6
One commentator posited that the public perception that gays and lesbians
embrace "sex as a lifestyle" has been a key element in gathering support for
sexual prohibitions aimed at homosexualsY
Mainstream religion has also buttressed fears that unbridled perversion
would be loosed on society if gays and lesbians were treated with equality.88
83. See supra note 39.
84. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1368,
1369 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
85. Koppelman, supra note 73, at 151.
86. Id.
87. Trosino, supra note 13, at 117.
88. Karst, supra note 20, at 684. ("The head of the National Christian Action
Coalition listed these evils to illustrate the nation's drift into moral bankruptcy:
'planned parenthood, the pill, no-fault divorce, open marriages, gay rights, palimony,
test-tube babies, women's liberation, children's liberation, unisex, day-care centers,
child advocates, and abortion on demand. A man is no longer responsible for his
family; a woman need not honor and obey her husband. God has been kicked out, and
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In a recent case involving a lesbian mother's right to visitation, a South
Dakota Supreme Court judge stated, "[t]o give [the lesbian mother] rights of
reasonable visitation so that she can teach [her children] to be homosexuals
would be the zenith of poor judgment for the judiciary of this state." 9
Citing Leviticus 18:229" for support, he further reasoned that because the
mother is involved in "a life of abomination . . . she should be totally
estopped from contaminating these children."91 While views such as these
still exist among portions of the population, there is a growing trend toward
tolerating and respecting differences. This South Dakota judge recognized the
trend but dismissed it by declaring, "[t]here appears to be a transitory
phenomenon on the American scene that homosexuality is okay. Not so. The
Bible decries it."'
As portions of society fight to keep gays and lesbians in the lower strata
of social acceptance, others work to remove the stigma and prejudice. Several
states have affirmatively attempted to afford gays and lesbians equal social
rights by including homosexuality as a protected class under discrimination
laws.9" The District of Columbia has created a "Commission on Domestic
Partnership Benefits" which guarantees domestic partnership rights to
homosexual and heterosexual cohabitants who are employed by the District of
Columbia.94 Essentially, this allows a homosexual partner of a government
employee to be treated in the same manner as a spouse with respect to
benefits.95 Several private companies and organizations have chosen to
humanism enthroned."' Id.)
89. Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
90. "Do not lie with a man as with a woman; that is detestable," Leviticus 18:22
(New International Version).
91. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 896.
92. Id. at 897.
93. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181b(a) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609-595(b) (West 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.765 (West 1986)
(employment), 21.35 (West 1986) (national guard), 36.12 (West 1992) (students at
University of Wisconsin), 38.23 (West Supp. 1992) (vocational, technical and adult
education), and 66.395 (West 1990) (housing).
94. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-3601 (Supp. 1993).
95. Id. In addition, the municipalities of Alameda County, California; Berkeley,
California; Laguna Beach, California; Los Angeles, California; San Francisco,
California; San Mateo County, California; Santa Cruz, California; West Hollywood,
California; Tacoma Park, Maryland; Cambridge, Massachusetts;Ann Arbor, Michigan;
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Ithaca, New York; New York, New York; Travis County,
Texas; Burlington, Vermont; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin provide
domestic partnership benefits for city employees. HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A LEGAL
GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 1-9 (7th ed. 1993).
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institute similar programs whereby homosexual partners are afforded the same
benefits as other employees' spouses.
9 6
The trend to accept homosexuality as a morally neutral trait is also
evidenced by the American Psychiatric Association's decision to remove
homosexuality from its list of disorders.' In a 1976 meeting of the
American Psychological Association, a resolution was passed which stated,
"the sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation of natural or prospective
adoptive or foster parents should not be the sole or primary variable
considered in custody or placement cases." '  Even factions of organized
Christianity have responded to the change in societal views. Several
mainstream denominations have debated whether to accept homosexuals in
their congregations and whether they should be eligible for ordination.9
Some churches have even adopted a stated policy supporting gay and lesbian
civil rights.' A Pennsylvania court, in a recent child custody case stated:
In resolving disputes about the custody of children, the court system should
recognize the reality of children's lives, however unusual or complex....
By failing to do so, they perpetuate the fiction of family homogeneity at the
96. Private companies and organizations granting partner benefits include the
National Quaker Organization, the American Psychological Association, Ben & Jerry's
Homemade, the Episcopal Diocese of Newark, New Jersey, Levi Strauss & Co.,
Lotus Development Corporation, and (owner of Universal Pictures). Curry, supranote
95, at 1-10. Such benefits are also provided by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Massachusetts. William A. Henry IIl, Pride and Prejudice, TIME, June 27, 1994, at
59. Other companies have instituted policies prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. Among them are IBM, Eastman Kodak, Harley-Davidson, Dow
Chemical, Du Pont, 3M, and Time-Warner. Id.
97. THE AMmCAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
IVAuAL OF IMNTAL DISORDERS III at 281-82, 380 (3d ed. 1980) states:
"Homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or
general social or vocational abilities."
98. John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American PsychologicalAssociation, Inc.,
for the Year 1976: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Counsel of Representatives,
32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 408, 432 (1977).
99. Tamar Lewin, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al.
100. As of 1990, the following religious organizations had a stated policy
supporting gay and lesbian civil rights: General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church;
UnionofAmerican Hebrew Congregations;NationalAssociationofReligiousBrothers;
General Convention of the Episcopal Church; United Methodist Church; Central
Conference of American Rabbis; United Church of Christ; Christian Church, Disciples
of Christ; Lutheran Church of America; Unitarian Universalist Association of
Congregations; National Federation of Priests Council; and Metropolitan Community
Church. ROBIN KANE, WHO SUPPORTS THE GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT
7-8 (National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, 1990).
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expense of the children whose reality does not fit this form. ... [The
child's] best interest is served by exposing [the child] to reality and not
fostering in [the child] shame or abhorrence for [a parent's] nontraditional
commitment. 10 1
One's view of the morality of a gay or lesbian parent should not be the
focus of a child custody decision. If a parent's sexual orientation cannot be
shown to affect a child, it should be ignored. To the extent the gay or lesbian
parent's behavior can be shown to harm the child, it should be balanced
against harmful behaviors engaged in by the other parent. Only then is the
best interest of the child the true focus.
C. Judicial Response to Gay and Lesbian Parents
in Child Custody Cases
In a child custody case where one of the contestants is gay or lesbian, the
court must balance the possibility of harm to a child by virtue of being raised
by a homosexual with the harm of denying a child a relationship with the
lesbian or gay parent. When a court chooses to morally judge a homosexual
parent by judicially severing the parent-child relationship on the basis of
homosexuality alone, both the parent and the child are harmed by the
decision.10
2
In determining "the best interest of the child" in child custody disputes,
state courts have been forced to make moral judgments about gay and lesbian
parents. Courts which have addressed the fitness of homosexual parents to be
awarded custody of their children have applied one of three standards: the
"per se rule," a "rebuttable presumption" of unfitness, or a "nexus" test.
Three states have adopted the "per se rule," which establishes an
irrebuttable presumption that a parent who engages in homosexual behavior
of any sort is unfit.0 3 It is therefore in the best interest of the child to be
101. Blewv. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (quoting Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo.
L.J. 459, 469 (1990)).
102. While imprisoned for violating a sodomy law, Oscar Wilde, a nineteenth
century gay poet and playwright, wrote, "I can bear [all else except that] ... my two
children are taken from me by legal procedure. That is, and always will remain to me
a source of infinite distress, or infinite pain .... The disgrace of prison is as nothing
compared with it." David M. Rosenblum, Comment, Custody Rights of Gay and
Lesbian Parents, 36 VML. L. Rnv. 1665, 1665 (1991) (quoting Oscar Wilde, DE
PRo1UN~DIs 34 (R. Ross ed. 1909)).
103. Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); S.E.G.
v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Roev. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691,
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in the custody of the heterosexual parent or a third party.' One state has
adopted a "rebuttable presumption" that a homosexual parent is unfit, placing
the burden of proof on the homosexual parent to show that their behavior
poses no harm to the child.1"5 Nineteen states have adopted a "nexus" test
whereby homosexual conduct may be a factor for a court to consider, but it
may not be the sole basis for denying custody unless the parent contesting
custody can show that such conduct harmed the child.' Two states have
rejected the nexus test, but have not affirmatively adopted either the per se
rule or the rebuttable presumption test. 7 An additional three states have
considered the issue and rejected the per se rule without articulating a specific
standard. 0 8
693 (Va. 1985). But see Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 1930-93-2, 1994 WL 275049, at
*5 (Va. Ct. App. June 21, 1994).
104. Id.
105. Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988 WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 30,1988); Bennett v. O'Rourke, 1985 WL 3464 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985);
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
106. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985); In re Marriage of
Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 1030 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Gerald D. v. Peggy R.,
Nos. C-9104, 79-12-143-CV, 1980 WL 20452, at *8 (Del. Faro. Ct. Nov. 17, 1980);
In re L.S. and V.L., Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598, at *2 (D.C. Aug.
30, 1991) (allowed lesbian couple to adopt each other's child while maintaining
parental rights to their own child as well); Buck v. Buck, 233 S.E.2d 792, 793 (Ga.
1977) (no affirmative showing that lesbianmother's sexual preference would not harm
child to award custody to the mother where shown father would be just as good a
parent); D.H.v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. 1983); Hodsonv. Moore, 464 N.W.2d
699, 701-02 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So.2d 321, 324 (La. Ct.
App. 1984); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980); People v.
Brown, 212 N.W.2d 55,59 (Mich. 1973); In re Adoption of child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d
550, 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (allowed lesbian to adopt biological child of
her partner); A.C. v. C.B., 829 A.2d 660, 664-65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Guinan v.
Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 964 (N.Y. 1984); Johnsonv. Schiotman, 502 N.W.2d 831,
835 (N.D. 1993); Large v. Large, No. 93AP-735, 1993 WL 498127, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 2, 1993); Blewv. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Stroman
v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704,705-06 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and
E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d
886, 888 (Wash. 1983).
107. M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982); Chicoine v. Chicoine,
479 N.W.2d 891, 894 (S.D. 1992).
108. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ell. App. Ct. 1993) ("Sexual
orientation is not relevant to a parent's visitation rights. It is only relevant if it directly
harms [the child]."); In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 292 (111. App. Ct.
1991); A. v. A. 514 P.2d 358, 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329
S.E.2d 57, 60-61 (W.Va. 1985).
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1. The Per Se Rule
Courts which deny gay and lesbian parents custody of their children
based on the per se rule consistently cite a combination of five factors in
support of their decision. The grounds relied on are: (1) the adverse effectthe
parent will have on the child's moral development, (2) the harassment and
ridicule the child might receive from others, (3) state sodomy laws, (4) the
fear that the child might be more likely to be a homosexual if raised by a
homosexual parent, and (5) the fear that the child is at an increased risk for
contracting AIDS."°9
A finding that a homosexual parent will adversely affect a child's moral
development because of his/her sexual orientation is premised on a belief that
homosexual conduct evidences pervasive immorality. Because of the diversity
of views attached to the moral implications of homosexual behavior, courts
should abstain from basing judgments on such reasoning and defer to the
parents' views of right and wrong in raising their children."0
In order to rely on others' negative reactions to the homosexual
stereotype and on sodomy laws, courts following the per se approach have
been forced to deny the analogy, noted by several members of the Supreme
Court,"' between miscegenation laws and sodomy laws."' To recognize
the analogy would require submission to the standard outlined in Palmore v.
Sidoti."3 In addition, to rely on sodomy laws where the parent has never
been convicted of their violation is to presume guilt where innocence may be
the reality.14
The fear that children raised by gays and lesbians are more likely to be
homosexual is unfounded. It is premised on the belief that homosexuality is
a learned behavior. However, "every study on the subject has revealed that
the incidence of same-sex orientation among the children of gays and lesbians
occurs as randomly and in the same proportion as it does among children in
the general population." '
109. David S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because
They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions ofParental Unfitness in Custody
Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L. Ruv. 395, 396 (1990).
110. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text; supra part lll.B.
111. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
113. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("The Constitution cannot control such prejudices
but neither can it tolerate them.").
114. Studies indicate that many lesbians infrequently or never participate in
activities which would violate the sodomy laws. See Note, Custody Denials, supra
note 72, at 635.
115. Steve Susoeff, Comment, AssessingChildren 'sBest Interests When A Parent
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To base denial of custody on fear of an increased risk of contracting
AIDS where there is no indication that the parent is infected does nothing but
enforce the stereotype that only homosexuals contract AIDS. In fact, lesbians
have a very low incidence of HIV infection in proportion to the rest of
society. 6 If merely being a member of a high risk population warrants
denial of child custody, then all hemophiliacs would be similarly denied the
opportunity to raise their children in the face of a custody battle.
The five articulated reasons for denying custody to gay and lesbian
parents presume facts not uniformly present among them impose judgments
on private behavior without inquiry into the parent-child relationship. Child
custody decisions should be driven solely by which living arrangement is in
the best interest of the child. To the extent that the behavior of a gay or
lesbian parent can be shown to have an adverse impact on a child, it should
be considered. However, when a court allows a parent's sexual orientation to
drive the consideration by irrebuttably presuming that it is never in the best
interest of a child to be placed with a homosexual parent, the child's best
interest may be sacrificed in order to enforce a stereotype.
a. The Missouri Approach
Missouri is one of the few states that still consistently applies the per se
rule. Missouri courts have maintained a steadfast commitment to the notion
that homosexuality renders parents unfit to raise their own children. Such a
commitment to moral imperatives is not new. In an 1883 decision upholding
Missouri's miscegenation statute, the court stated:
It is stated as well as authenticatedfact that if the issue of a black man and
a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they
cannot possibly have any progeny, and such a fact sufficientlyjustifies those
laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and whites, laying out of
view other sufficient ground for such enactments." 7
In a 1982 Missouri case, which is widely cited as a comprehensive study
of the law at the time, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that the per se
rule was the majority rule, citing only three states which allowed homosexuals
is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882
(1985).
116. Marshall Kirk & Hunter Nadsen, AFTER THE BALL, How AMERICA WILL
CONQUER ITS FEAR & HATRED OF GAYS iN TiE 90's 25 (1989); Jackie Winnow,
Lesbians Evolving Health Care: Cancer and Aids, FEMINIST REvIEw, Summer 1992,
at 68, 70.
117. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (emphasis added).
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to have custody of their children and seven that did not."' Although that
survey is no longer accurate, it is still relied on by Missouri courts and cited
in other states' opinions. Of the seven states cited, only one, Oklahoma, still
maintains that homosexuality can be relied on in denying custody."9
However, the Oklahoma courts have not considered the issue in a reported
decision since 1982.120
The 1982 Missouri survey of foreign law cited New York and New
Jersey as states which denied custody to parents on the basis of
homosexuality. 21 In 1984, New York courts adopted the nexus standard in
a decision which stated that sexual orientation, "should be a consideration in
a custody dispute only if [it] is shown to adversely affect the child's
welfare."" New York courts have also been among the first to allow gay
men and lesbians to adopt children, which clearly shows that their policy
encompasses finding that it is sometimes in the best interest of a child to be
placed with a parent who happens to be homosexual." New Jersey courts
have adopted a similar position. In a decision upholding a lesbian's right to
adopt her partner's child, a New Jersey court stated, "if there is ever any
harassment or community disapproval, this court should have no role in
supporting or tacitly approving such behavior.'
24
118. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 870-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (The
court restricted the natural father's visitation with his son to no overnight visits and
prohibited the father from taking his son to gay activist gatherings or to churches that
approve of homosexual marriages.).
119. M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982).
120. In rendering their 1982 decision, the Oklahoma court relied in part on a
psychologist's testimony that, "[i]f [the child] has been taught in some way that it is
very sinful and he becomes aware of it, that could be as traumatic as growing up with
it being somewhat normal and then finding out that society considers it wrong, but he
is going to have to deal with it at that point either way." Id. at 969.
121. J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 870.
122. Guinanv. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (upheld
award of custody to lesbian mother).
123. In re Commitment of J.N. and E.N., 601 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1993) (granted adoption of Black child to White lesbian foster mother over child's
natural grandmother). In another New York case, the court reported, "research that has
been done in recent years on the possible differences between children of gay and
lesbian parents and children of heterosexual parents in otherwise comparable
circumstances reveals no disadvantages among the former in any significant respect."
In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (N.Y. 1992).
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The 1982 Missouri survey also cited North Carolina and Michigan as
states denying custody to homosexual parents." Both of the cited cases
upheld a restriction that the parent's lover not be present during overnight
visitation periods. 6 Although there are no printed North Carolina decisions
which address the issue of vesting primary custody in a gay or lesbian parent,
a subsequent decision upheld a gay father's right to unrestricted overnight
visits with his son. 27 A 1973 Michigan decision, which was apparently
overlooked by the Missouri court, held that the fact that a mother is a lesbian
is insufficient to establish that she is unfit for custody of her natural child
without an additional showing that the mother's behavior somehow harmed the
child.128
Other courts cited by the Missouri survey as denying custody to
homosexuals include North Dakota, Indiana, and Utah.'29 In a 1993
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the nexus standard for
considering the sexual orientation of a parent for child custody purposes. 30
Additionally, the court stated that if the heterosexual custodial parent
"poisoned the children's minds and hearts with his unyielding, uncharitable
intolerance of homosexuality, a change of custody would be required to
protect the children's best interests.''
The Missouri court cited an Indiana case for the proposition that a
majority of courts frnd it in the best interest of the child to award custody to
a heterosexual parent based on sexual orientation alone.'32 In fact, the
Indiana case cited in the 1982 Missouri survey states, "we believe the proper
rule to be that homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any adverse
effect upon the welfare of the child does not render the homosexual parent
unfit as a matter of law to have custody of the child."'33  Requiring a
showing that the child is harmed by the parent's behavior in order for it to
impact a custody determination is a clear articulation of the nexus test.
Finally, the Missouri court relied on a frequently cited Utah decision, Kallas
v. Kallas34 In Kallas, the court allowed evidence of the mother's sexual
behavior to be considered in determining whether overnight visitation should
125. J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 870.
126. Id.
127. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775, 776 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
128. People v. Brown, 212 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Mich. 1973).
129. J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 871.
130. Johnsonv. Sehlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993).
131. Id. at 837 (Levine, J., concurring).
132. J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 871.
133. D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
134. 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).
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be allowed.135 No test for considering sexual orientation of a parent in
custody disputes was adopted by the Kallas court. Rather, the court noted
other questionable behavior engaged in by the mother such as making sexual
advances to a thirteen year old girl and approaching others to buy drugs.'36
In light of the failure to articulate a standard with respect to homosexuality,
and given the presence of several detrimental variables which could easily be
considered harmful to a child, one simply cannot extrapolate meaning from the
Kallas decision as to the position of Utah courts on awarding custody to gay
and lesbian parents.
Missouri courts have traditionally applied a "judicial policy [ ] to
conclusively presume the detrimental impact on a child from the parent's
homosexuality.""13  The courts have attempted to hide this policy under
equitable verbiage such as: "Fundamental rights of parents may not be denied,
limited or restricted on the basis of sexual orientation, per se."'38 While
verbally reciting such a standard, the court denied a lesbian mother custody
of her child because the child "may thereby be condemned, in one degree or
another, to sexual disorientation, to social ostracism, contempt and
unhappiness."'39 The court went on to further expose this hypocrisy when
it held that although all the evidence suggested the child was "normal and
well-adjusted . .. [t]he court need not wait, though, till the damage is
done." 4' Presuming that living with a homosexual parent harms a child,
when there is evidence to the contrary, erects an irrebuttable presumption that
a gay man or lesbian is unfit to be a custodial parent.
The Missouri Supreme Court has stated that "sexual misconduct does not
ipso facto dictate the award of custody one way or the other."''" Therefore,
the Court in T.C.H. v. KMH. reasoned, "one spouse's testimony as to the
other's [homosexual or heterosexual] extramarital affairs should be considered
by the court."' 42  On remand, the trial court denied the lesbian mother
custody of her children. In reviewing that decision, the appellate court
135. Id. at 643.
136. Id.
137. G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Lowenstein, J.,
dissenting).
138. N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting In
re J.S. and C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 693 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Mo. 1985) (quoting Robertson v.
Robertson, 630 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)) (holding that communication
between a husband and wife is not confidential and privileged when it relates to a
matter material in determining an award of child custody).
142. Id. at 805.
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expounded that considering a spouse's homosexual affair raises an irrebuttable
presumption of unfitness: "Missouri case law recognizes, that a parent's
homosexuality 'can never be kept private enough to be a neutral factor in the
development of a child's values and character.' '[A] court cannot ignore the
effect which the sexual conduct of a parent may have on a child's moral
development.' 
1 43
There are no reported Missouri decisions where known lesbian or gay
parents have been awarded custody or unrestricted visitation with their natural
children. In contrast, judicial scrutiny of spouses involved in heterosexual
extramarital affairs has not been so strict. In Wilhelmsen v. Peck,4 1 the
Missouri Court of Appeals upheld an award of custody to a mother who had
two successive live-in paramours in the home she shared with her sons.1
45
The court stated that her "illicit" relationships were insufficient to affect
custody unless "the moral conduct of the offending spouse is so gross,
promiscuous, open or coupled with other types of antisocial behavior as to
directly affect the physical, mental, economic or social well-being of a
child. 14
6
Without regard to the fitness of the homosexual parent, the unfitness of
the heterosexual parent, or the parent-child relationship, Missouri courts
presume that "placing primary custody of a minor child with the
nonhomosexual parent is in the best interests of the child.""14  In a case
where custody was originally granted to the mother, the order was changed to
award custody to the father when new evidence was uncovered that the mother
was involved in a lesbian relationship. 48 The court based its change in
custody on the prospective criteria that it was in the best interest of the
children "to protect [them] from peer pressure, teasing, and possible
ostracizing they may encounter as a result of the 'alternative lifestyle' their
mother has chosen."'1
49
In a dissenting opinion in a Missouri Court of Appeals case, Judge
Lowenstein demonstrated the detrimental result of applying a per se rule by
stating the facts of a case where a mother was denied custody because of her
homosexual behavior:
143. T.C.H.v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting G.A,
745 S.W.2d at 728) (citations omitted).
144. 743 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
145. Id. at 94.
146. Id. at 93 (citing In re Marriage of F., 602 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980)).
147. S.L.H. v. D.B.H., 745 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
148. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
149. Id. at 166.
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The mother provides the child with his own room in a well-kept house,
enrolls him in a pre-school, has a steady nursing job, cares about the child,
and, despite sleeping with and occasionally hugging a woman, has stated
under oath she would discourage her son from emulating her sexual
preference. The father has limited education, an income of $6,500 and
lives in basically a one room cabin containing a toilet surrounded by a
curtain; the child sleeps in a foldup cot by a woodstove and plays in an area
littered with Busch beer cans, collected by the father's 'slow' sister, who
was ordered by the trial court not to care for the boy while alone .... To
say it is in the best interests of this little boy to put him in the sole custody
of the father, who was pictured leering at a girly magazine, solely on the
basis of the mother's sexual preference, would be and is a mistake."'
b. The Bottoms Case
In a recent, highly publicized decision,"' a Virginia trial court removed
custody of a child from Sharon Bottoms, the natural mother, and awarded it
to the maternal grandmother, Kay Bottoms, because the mother was involved
in a lesbian relationship."' A Virginia Court of Appeals overturned the
decision, holding that the presumption in favor of granting custody to a
natural parent over a third party was not rebutted by evidence of the mother's
lesbianism alone.153 Most likely Kay Bottoms will seek review of the
decision in the Virginia Supreme Court."4 It is unclear whether the
Virginia Supreme Court would change its previous rule and follow the trend
of courts by applying the nexus test or whether it would maintain that an
irrebuttable presumption of unfitness attaches to lesbian and -gay parents.
Therefore, an analysis of the trial judge's decision is instructive on how the
per se rule is applied and its practical consequences.
150. G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 729 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting).
151. After the decision was announced, the parties received requests for
interviews from radio and television stations in Australia and Canada as well as the
United States. Oprah Winfrey, Phil Donahue, Larry King, Sally Jessie Raphael,
Geraldo Rivera, Maury Povich, Montel Williams, Jane Whitney, Jerry Springer, "Eye
to Eye with Connie Chung," "20-20" and "Prime Time Live" all requested interviews.
Deborah Kelly, Bottoms CaseProves to be Magnetfor Talk Shows, RICHMOND TvMES-
DISPATCH, Sept. 9, 1993, at Al. Interview requests also came from USA Today,
People and Time. Ray McAllister, Virginia is For Talk Shows, RICHMOND TIms-
DISPATH, Sept. 15, 1993, at B1.
152. Deborah Kelly, Lesbian Ruled Unfit to Raise 2-Year-Old Custody Decision
Upheld in Henrico, RICiMoND TMms-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1993, at Al.
153. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 1994 WL 275049, at 3 (Va. Ct. App. June 21, 1994).
154. Appeals Court Awards Custody of Boy, Z, to his Lesbian Mother, KANsAS
Crry STAR, June 22, 1994, at A3.
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The ruling of the trial judge limited Sharon Bottoms, the natural mother,
to a weekly, thirty-two hour, overnight, restricted visit with her son."'
During the weeklyvisit, Tyler, Sharon's son, was prohibited from being in the
presence of Sharon's lover or visiting the apartment the couple shares.'56
The trial judge stated his reasons for the decision:
It is the opinion of this court that the conduct is immoral, and the conduct
of Sharon Bottoms renders her an unfit parent. However, I also must
recognize a presumption in law in favor of the custody being with the
actual parent .... Then I ask myself-Sharon Bottoms' circumstances of
unfitness-are they of such an extraordinary nature to rebut this
presumption? My answer to this is yes. 57
The irony of this decision was that custody was awarded to Kay Bottoms,
a woman who lived with a man for seventeen years without being married
while raising her two children."' On advice from her lawyer, Kay asked
her paramour to move out of her home only shortly after she decided to seek
custody of Tyler.'59 Sharon testified that she was sexually abused by her
mother's live-in boyfriend twice a week for five years 6' before moving out
of the house at age eighteen to escape the systematic abuse.'61 Yet, in the
eyes of the trial court, Sharon Bottoms' commitment to a relationship with a
member of her own sex overshadowed any harm to the child which might
result from being raised by a woman who has a history of exposing children
to child molesters.
Even though his parental rights have not been terminated, Tyler's natural
father was not allowed to testify in court as to his preference for a
custodian.'62 Outside of court, the natural father expressed sorrow over the
decision to place Tyler in the custody of the maternal grandmother, Kay
Bottoms. 63 Although the father did not fight for custody, he did state that








161. Ellen Goodman, Imagining a Gentler Outcome in the Richmond Case,
RICHMOND TMiEs-DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1993, at A9.
162. Kelly, supra note 152.
163. Deborah Kelly, Dad Hopes Lesbian Regains Tot Boy's Father Speaks Out
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The attorney for the grandmother commented that Virginia residents
believe "that this country is in about the same place as the Roman Empire,
when the Roman Empire fell because of lesbianism, homosexuals and things
of this nature." '165 As evidenced by the numerous supporters of Sharon
Bottoms throughout this ordeal, not all Virginia residents subscribe to this
belief. National leaders of The Commission on Social Action of Reform
Judaism publicly spoke out against the decision.166 The ruling also spurred
the largest turnout in history to Richmond's Gay Pride Parade and Gay Pride
Festival, which was held just days after the decision was announced.'67 The
Bottoms case illustrates that the best interest of the child is sometimes
sacrificed when the court invokes its own standard of morality rather than
deferring to the morality of the parent on issues which cannot be affirmatively
shown to harm the child.'68 When a court attempts to legally force societal
homogeneity, it abandons the duty to determine which living arrangement will
be in a child's best interest in favor of ensuring that the child will be raised
by a heterosexual.
The Virginia Appellate Court recognized the inequity of divesting Sharon
Bottoms of custody in favor of Kay Bottoms. The trial court stated that in
order to remove custody from a natural parent, "more is required than simply
showing that a parent.., is not meeting society's traditional or conventional
165. Deborah Kelly, LesbianMother Tells Story, Bottoms Partnerlnterviewedfor
Connie Chung TVProgram, RICHMOND TiMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 1993, at B3.
166. Ed Briggs, Custody Decision CriticizedReform Jews DefendLesbian Mom 's
Rights, RICHMOND TIvms-DISPATcH, Sept. 22, 1993, at B3. The commission's
chairman, Evely Laser Shlensky, and director, Rabbi Eric Yoffie, who is also a vice
president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, stated: "A homosexual
who is shownto be a neglectful, abusive or incompetent parent has no more right than
a heterosexual to retain custody of a child. But for a judge to single out
homosexuality or lesbianism as the single issue on which to base a custody ruling
violates not only the concept of a parent's traditional right but (also) his or her
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws." Id.
167. Peter Bacque, Marching With Pride But Many Gay Parents Fear Losing
Children, RIcHMoND TRvES-DISPATCH, Sept. 13, 1993, at B1.
168. Sharon Bottoms' partner wrote a poem dedicated to Tyler titled "A Child in
the Middle" which illustrates some of the hardship rendered by the court's decision:
"A little boy with bright blue eyes, wanting to know the how's and why's / Tom apart
by cruelty and hate, and everyone ponders the child's fate / To see the sadness to feel
the pain of a lonely mother who some try to blame / The child we see will suffer
forever because of the bonds they force him to sever / Today we pray that God is with
us and corrects this wrong and painful injustice." Lesbian Mother in Custody Fight
Henrico Case Could Become Landmark, RICHMOND TIMEs-DIsPATCH, Sept. 7, 1993,
atB1.
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standards of morality." '69 Rather, the court stated that it would "not remove
a child from the custody of a parent, based on proof that the parent is engaged
in private, illegal sexual conduct or conduct considered by some to be deviant,
in the absence of proof that such behavior or activity poses a substantial threat
of harm to a child's emotional, psychological, or physical well-being.0
70
2. The Rebuttable Presumption of Unfitness
A rebuttable presumption places the burden of proof on gay or lesbian
parents to show that their behavior does not pose a harm to the child.
Application of this standard may preclude a homosexual parent from being
awarded custody when all other factors are equal. 71  However, it does
overcome the problem presented by the per se rule where a child may be
placed in a detrimental situation because of the irrebuttable presumption that
a homosexual parent is unfit.
172
Use of a presumption in a child custody case infers that the substance of
the presumption is in the best interest of the child. In balancing competing
characteristics of parents seeking custody, no one characteristic should be
determinative of the outcome. The child's interests are best served by
examining the overall fitness of each parent.
Whether one believes that a parent being gay or lesbian is harmful in and
of itself is largely dependent on one's moral judgment of homosexuality. To
the extent that an honest debate exists among respected members of society
whether homosexual behavior is morally neutral or morally corrupt, the court
should not presume that those who view it as morally corrupt are correct.
Without evidence that the sexual orientation of a parent affects the child's
welfare, the widely contested notion that it is not in the best interest of a child
to be placed with a homosexual parent should not be elevated to the status of
a presumption. To the extent that a parent's sexual orientation negatively
affects a child, it should be weighed, along with other factors that negatively
affect a child, in determining the child's best interest. To the extent that no
harm can be shown, a parent's sexual orientation should be treated as a neutral
factor. Allowing neutral factors of one parent to be weighed against negative
factors of the other parent in balancing a child's best interest serves only to
169. Bottoms, 1994 WL 275049 at *5.
170. Id.
171. See Collins v. Collins, 1988 WL 30173, at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30,
1988).
172. AMissourijudge argued for adoption of the rebuttable presumption standard
in a dissenting opinion to a case denying custody to a lesbian mom. See G.A.v.D.A.,
745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Lowenstein, J., dissenting).
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disrupt the proper balance. When this occurs, it is the child who is put at risk,
and it is the child whose best interest may not be served.
3. The Nexus Test
The nexus test allows consideration of a parent's homosexuality as a
factor, but it cannot be the basis for denying custody absent evidence of harm
to the child. Under the nexus test, harm cannot be presumed, but must be
proven on a case by case basis.'73 Courts which have adopted the nexus test
hold that the state cannot sever the relationship between a parent and child
"merely because that parent's lifestyle is not within the societal
mainstream.""174 A Pennsylvania court explained:
Of primary importance to the child's well-being is the child's full and
realistic knowledge of his parents, except where it can be shown that
exposure to the parent is harmful to the child: Courts ought not to impose
restrictions which unnecessarily shield children from the true nature of their
parents unless it can be shown that some detrimental impact will flow from
the specific behavior of the parent.17
5
The majority of courts which have addressed the issue find that there is no
"detrimental impact" on children raised by homosexual parents by virtue of
their sexual orientation alone. 176 These courts have also found that it is not
the position of the court to favor one parent's moral judgment over the other
parent's when no indication of harm can be shown by exposure to either. 
171
, Several courts adopting the nexus standard have relied on scientific
studies to support their finding that harm to the child cannot be presumed
because the custodian is homosexual. In a recent decision, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court relied on testimony by an assistant clinical professor of
psychiatry at Harvard Medical School that children raised by lesbians and gay
173. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska i985) ("Simply put, it is
impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's
status as a lesbian.")
174. In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 890 (Wash. 1983) (Stafford,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
175. Blewv. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. 1992).
176. See supra note 106.
177. In re Marriage of Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 1031 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) ("The unconventional lifestyle of one parent, or the opposing moral positions of
the parties, or the outright condemnation of one parent's beliefs by the other parent's
religion, which may result in confusion for the child, do not provide an adequate basis
for restricting visitation rights.").
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men develop normally."8 In another case, a psychology expert testified that
"most children raised in homosexual situations become heterosexual as adults
.... There is no evidence that children who are raised with a loving couple
of the same sex are any more disturbed, unhealthy, [or] maladjusted than
children raised with a loving couple of mixed sex." 79 In response, the court
held that "[tihe state may not deprive parents of custody of their children '...
simply because the parents embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds
with the average.'
1 80
The nexus standard allows courts which are confronted with the reality
of lesbian and gay parents to find that the child's "best interest is served by
exposing [the child] to reality and not fostering in [the child] shame or
abhorrence for [the parent's] nontraditional commitment." '1 The Vermont
Supreme Court observed in a recent decision:
When social mores change, governing statutes must be interpreted to allow
for those changes in a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind
their enactment .... Social fragmentation and the myriad configurations
of modem families have presented us with new problems and complexities
that cannot be solved by idealizing the past."'
2
The result of idealizing the past is to deprive children of lesbians and gays a
relationship with their natural parent."
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the intensity with which some members of the judiciary and
of society harbor moral judgments on issues such as interracial and
homosexual relationships, the fact remains that such relationships do exist.
Many people involved in such relationships are also parents who desire to
raise their children in accordance with their own beliefs. Unless it can be
shown that living with a particular parent is harmful to the child, the best
interest of all children is to be raised by their natural parents. In deciding
between parents, the best interest of the child is served by balancing the
178. In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993).
179. Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215-16 (Mass. 1980).
180. Id. at 1216 (quoting Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 (1979)).
181. Blew, 617 A.2d at 36.
182. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).
183. See Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (l. App. Ct. 1993) ("We are
disturbed by the [trial] judge's numerous homophobic comments. His personal beliefs
improperly clouded his judgment. Consequently, for the last four years, a little boy
has been deprived of unrestricted visits with his mother.").
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competing characteristics of each parent rather than making absolute
judgments by presuming that individual characteristics render one parent unfit.
When the only harm posited to exist is "moral harm," the question should be
posed whether severing family ties on such a basis is in the best interest of the
child or if it is really in the best interest of those attempting to invoke moral
standards in the form of legal sanctions.
Protection of the child does not occur by ensuring that all children are
raised in a similar setting. Rather, protection results from ensuring that the
individual child and his or her individual heritage will be respected by the
government. As family diversity increases, the courts must consider child
custody issues from the perspective of the relationship between the parent and
the child. In determining the plight of the children of gays and lesbians
during a time when society's moral judgment of homosexuality is in flux, the
judiciary should reflect on the history of the struggle of interracial couples to
establish a legally recognized family in the face of "moral" opposition. A
decision dictating who will obtain custody of a child will impact that child's
life forever. Therefore, courts must be cautious to consider all relevant factors
free from personal prejudices. Courts must use their power to protect
children, not to enforce stereotypes and maintain societaluniformity. Custody
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